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A PHENOMENOLOGY OF SOCIAL 
STANCES*
abstract
The paper develops a phenomenology of social stances, trying to show that Margaret Gilbert’s work 
on joint commitments can be understood as a special case of what here presented. The offered 
conceptualization shows that “to accept” is an important moment of social reality (as in Gilbert’s work), 
but also that there are many more stances to be discussed which are important. These are “to refuse” (or 
“to rebel against”), “to suffer”, “to assent” and “to make something one’s own”. The last part of the paper 
tests the explanatory power of the sketched theory, trying to show that it provides valuable elements for 
an account of convention.
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A PHENOMENOLOGY OF SOCIAL STANCES
The present paper will try to show that, through a phenomenology of social stances, it is 
possible to give a better account of some of the philosophical problems Margaret Gilbert 
tries to solve in her social philosophy and that in this way it is possible to better explain the 
phenomena of joint commitment and acting together.
First of all, let us consider Gilbert’s core notion of joint commitment, in order to prepare 
the background for the following parts. Gilbert’s social theory is built on the notion of 
joint commitment. According to Gilbert, a personal decision is a case of commitment. This 
means that the commitment as such does not need to have a social dimension; indeed “a 
personal commitment is brought into existence by one person alone” (Gilbert 2014, p. 31). 
Consequently, a personal commitment is rescinded when the person changes her mind. A joint 
commitment, instead, comes into existence when two or more people commit themselves to 
do something as a body, or as a unit, or as one. Gilbert expresses her idea with the formula: “to 
endorse a certain goal as a body” (Gilbert 2008, p. 33). The commitment brings out obligations, 
so that after the joint commitment is in place the parties are reciprocally obliged to act 
according to such joint commitment. Each of the parties cannot rescind the commitment 
unilaterally, under normal circumstances. On this ground, Gilbert defines a collective action as 
follows:
Persons X, Y, and so on, collectively perform action A if and only if X, Y, et. al. are jointly 
committed to intend as a body to perform A and, in light of this joint commitment, 
relevant persons from among X, Y, et al. act accordingly (Gilbert 2014, p. 70).
So, for instance, Jane and Hilda go hiking to the top of the mountain; for this reason they 
jointly commit themselves to intend as a body to hike to the top of the mountain (Gilbert 
2014, pp. 70-71). Each of the two acts doing such things as not leaving the companion behind, 
encouraging her to move, or rebuking the other if she does not comply with the commitment. 
The notion of collective action is meant to work both for simple cases and for complex ones. As 
one can see the joint commitment creates obligations and collective actions: Gilbert introduces 
the “we”, the collective action, as something new in social philosophy, not reducible to the 
acts of the individuals.
In what follows I will develop a phenomenology of social stances (§ 2.) trying to show that 
Gilbert’s work on joint commitments can be understood as a special case of what here 







of social reality, but also that there are many more stances to be discussed which are 
important, such as “to refuse”(or “to rebel against”), “to suffer”, “to assent” and “to make 
something one’s own”. Finally, (§ 3.) I will test the explanatory power of the sketched theory, 
trying to show that it provides valuable elements for an account of convention.
I will now present a phenomenology of social stances made up of five irreducible elements: 
to refuse (or rebel against), to suffer (or to be subject to), to accept, to assent and to make 
something one’s own.1 I will try to show that each of them has its own essence so that in order 
to give an adequate account of social reality it is not possible to reduce their number. On the 
other hand, it would be possible to make further distinctions: for example, the case of refusal 
could be distinguished from that of rebelling (as I will point out).
For a better understanding of the importance of such distinctions it can be useful to consider 
the problems that their absence causes to other accounts of acting together. For this reason I 
develop my ideas keeping Gilbert’s work on the background. In so doing, I will try to show that 
Gilbert’s theory tends to overestimate the case of acceptance and does not see the importance 
of other relevant stances such as suffering, nor it is able to show the role played by refusal in 
social life.
Refusal is a special case in the scale of social stances. Of course, refusal is not exactly rebellion. 
However, they have something important in common: the interior attitude and the manifest 
attitude of resistance and/or of contrast to an X they are against. For this reason and for the 
sake of brevity I will discuss them here together. If not specified, what will be said about one 
can be considered valid also for the other.2
Rebellion is the zero level of the social relationship, being effective even when not actualized, 
because it is in principle always possible (apart from Orwell’s dystopia described in 1984, 
and even in that case as a tragic result of a struggle of the system against individual free 
will). Every relationship is already conditioned by the mere possibility of a refusal or, worse, 
of a rebellion. It is possible to fully appreciate acceptance and all the further stances (and 
eventually to feel gratitude) only on the background of the possibility of a refusal.
At first sight, it might seem strange to consider the case of rebellion as one step, even if quite 
low, on the ladder of social stances. Indeed, rebellion seems to be the negation of such a ladder. 
On second thought, however, we should consider the enormous difference between simply 
ignoring (I add “simply”, because ignoring could hide a true and subtle form of rebellion), on 
the one hand, and rebelling, on the other. The former is a case of an unconditioned action, as it 
is not a reaction to something else: the action has its own reasons. Rebellion, on the contrary, 
entails the intentional action which has in its agenda the opposition to a social reality, such 
as a social status, a norm, an institution, which has a claim (or a set of claims). Rebellion fights 
the reasons of what is its target (X), or the very existence of X. It is indeed a social stance, even 
though extreme: its goal is to transform the social situation radically. The rebel, in her fight, 
acts “together” with her opponent: the fight is the resultant of the collective action.
There is a second way social agents can act together in rebellion. People can act together, 
having a common goal: they can go storming the Bastille, for example. Each rebel, in such a 
case, does not have any commitment to the others. If one simply leaves the ground, no one 
1 The expression “stance” means the same as the german “Stellungnahme”. It refers to the intentional act of taking a 
position about something.
2 I do not use the notion of opposition (“to oppose”) here: refusal or rebellion are discussed as social stances, while 
“to oppose” has more to do with an activity and therefore with a possible outcome of the social stance.
2. 
A discussion of the 
social stances
2.1 
To refuse (to rebel 
against)2
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has the right to address her any complaint. At most, one can ask her: “Where are you going?”, 
“Why are you leaving?”, “Don’t leave” (which in this case cannot be a command), but this is 
far from a rebuke. The single rebel, for psychological reasons is expected to keep the pressure 
against the fortress, but he or she does not have any joint commitment. In the same way, mobs 
can perform collective actions, such as destroying a fortress, or killing the tyrant, without 
any joint commitment between the social agents performing the joint action. This gives some 
troubles to judge flash mobs performing violent acts. Accepting this leads to see that some 
collective actions, though being joint actions, do not have any collective “we” responsible for 
what happened; and yet each single agent is responsible for his or her own taking part in the 
collective action that emerged.
Students of social sciences, like Gilbert, tend to restrict the acting together to the acting in 
accordance with someone. As we have just seen, this is a limit that must be corrected. Here is 
Gilbert’s somehow romantic account of acting together:3
Two or more people are acting together (doing something together) if and only if: (1) 
they are jointly committed to espousing as a body the appropriate goal; (2) they are 
fulfilling the behavioural conditions associated with the achievement of the goal; (3) 
their satisfaction of these conditions is motivated in each case by the existence of the 
joint commitment (Gilbert 2008, p. 146).
In some cases of rebellion, however, people act together with others, as we have seen, but 
there is no joint commitment of any kind, nor any common goal (at least among opponents).
At this level we have collective actions of opposing and allied agents, but we do not have any 
social obligation.
While rebellion, acceptance, and the other social stances have been widely studied before (see 
e.g. Camus 1951; Gilbert 2014, pp. 131-162), the second step has been unfortunately neglected. 
To suffer or to be subject to the initiative of someone else does not entail being able to refuse 
it, or to rebel against it. Such stance is a midpoint between rebellion and acceptance. In this 
case, the social agent is passive, intimately not accepting what she considers to be wrong, or 
she dislikes, or she simply does not have reasons to accept. Yet she is not ready or able, or 
convinced, to contrast it. The strange thing is that apparently the social agent could be quite 
active in complying with what it is asked. This can be understood only by distinguishing social 
stances from social activities: one can be passive on the level of the interior personal stance 
and quite active on the level of the activity performed.
Let us take an example from Gilbert, whose discussions of going for a walk are possibly her 
major contribution to social philosophy. According to one of her examples, Paula and James 
ended up walking together, so performing a joint action. Let us see how she created and 
described the situation:
Perhaps Paula said, “Shall we go for a walk?” thus proposing a walk to James, and he 
accepted her proposal by saying “Yes, let’s”. In short, they agreed to go for a walk 
together. Having thus agreed, they set off their walk. Such an agreement is, clearly, a 
standard way of initiating joint action (Gilbert 2008, p. 116).
3 Gilbert’s defence is that her stipulative constructed theory explains the situations it explains. Her constructivist 
approach and her rigorous work give consistency to the theory. Here I try to show that the phenomena she discusses 
deserve a wider approach: consistency is important, but explanatory power is important too.
2.2 




Here it seems that acceptance is essential: James accepted the proposal and after such 
acceptance the joint action began. Let us now consider some new background details and, 
after that, let us reconsider what is happening. We now know that Paula is a terrorist, she 
wants James far away from the other prisoners, for some reason. James does not want to 
look weak and, above all, he knows that it is useless to resist. Here James is not accepting 
any commitment, he is just suffering an imposition, though performed without brutality. 
He complies with the request and even declares that he will comply, but he does not have 
any commitment. It would be odd to say that if he tries to escape during the walk, Paula 
has the right to rebuke him, because of his saying “Yes”. That agreement was just a sign 
of non rebellion. Again, also in this case, we have a collective action, but there is no joint 
commitment. We have a prima facie “we” acting coordinately, jointly, but nothing more, so 
that the agent suffering the action is active in performing the action itself. He is however not 
properly responsible for the doing, unless rebellion were a true option.
To suffer the initiative of others without rebellion, nor acceptance, is more common that one 
could imagine. I will try to show it later, when discussing Gilbert’s account of conventions (see 
§ 3.). I just want to anticipate here that to suffer the social reality does not necessarily entail 
feeling pain, being afraid or feeling sorrow; it is not necessarily a matter of negative feelings of 
any kind. It is rather a stance of the social agent not rebelling, nor accepting.
To accept the other’s initiative is a further step: in this case the agent does not just suffer the 
activity. Here we are two degrees far from rebellion (and refusal): with acceptance the social 
agent is not passive and intimately against what is done. More generally, acceptance is a 
stance in which the social agent is outwardly and inwardly open to what he has to deal with 
(whether an act, a status, an institution etc.). The point here is that the agent does not comply 
unwillingly, he is merely concessive. He has a neutral stance which is open to start a course of 
action: to be opened to something is quite far from giving one’s own assent to it. The initiative 
is of an X (someone or something) outside the social agent, so that the accepting social agent 
performs the minimal effort possible. Acceptance is the mildest stance.
To go back to the discussion of the walk of Paula with James presented above in its Gilbertian 
form, to accept the proposal, in the technical meaning here discussed, James will answer 
something like: “Why not?”: he does not have reasons to say “no”, and accepts the initiative of 
the other. Accordingly, one can see that Gilbert speaks of “acceptance” about James’ answer, 
“Yes, let’s”, because of the lack of a phenomenology of social stances in her thought. In a “Yes, 
let’s”, given under normal circumstances, we can find much more than a simple acceptance, as 
this stance is here explained.4
It is important here to notice that from this stance onwards, social obligations arise. Now James 
cannot leave Paula alone, taking a new direction, without any explanation or excuse. He has 
a social obligation to walk with her, and even amoral duty not to harm her sensibility leaving 
her alone or, worse, leaving her in a difficult situation such as walking alone in a dangerous 
neighborhood. Acceptance, however mild it may be, is the starting point for a collaborating 
activity, so that it is possible to say that it is the initial moment of an aware buildup of the social 
reality. Nevertheless, with sole acceptance, no social reality would be initiated, since acceptance 
is a passive stance. To find something more proactive one must go to the next social stances.
Assent can be treated in many ways: from a cognitive perspective, from a psychological point 
of view, with the approach of the philosophy of language. From the point of view of social 
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philosophy, assent has to do with the stance of social agent a in respect to an X (an act, a 
proposal, an institution, an emerging social reality, etc.) the agent a is dealing with. The assent 
is a social stance which consists in an interior “yes” given without reserve and manifested. 
The “Yes, let’s” of James, at length already discussed above, seems to be an instance of assent, 
rather than of acceptance. This is true, if the act is what it seems to be. In fact, we have already 
seen that a “Yes, let’s” could actually be a case of a suffered initiative.
The discussion so far can be summarized with the following table, built on the intuition of 
Adolf Reinach according to which social acts have two irreducible moments, an interior one 
and an exterior one (Reinach 1913):
To refuse To suffer To accept To assent
Interior attitude – – 0 +
Exterior manifestation – + + +
There are three values about the stance of the agent: negative (–), neutral (0) and positive 
(+). The table helps to understand why it may be easy to misinterpret, from an external 
perspective, a case of suffering situation X, with a case of giving assent to X.
The table also helps to grasp the reasons why assenting implies commitment: the intimate 
“yes” and its manifestation create social obligations. The social agent will be under a more 
severe judgement if she leaves the joint action assented, than she would by leaving a joint 
action she merely accepted. There are several levels of commitment. Social agents normally 
understand the social stance of the others and they judge and act accordingly. This fixes also 
the levels of trust from a degree that goes from assent to incorporation, the stance discussed 
in the next paragraph.
Indeed a good part of Gilbert’s analysis, rather than with acceptance, deals with assent, so that 
her theory of joint commitment can be considered a special case of a wider theory sketched 
through the analysis offered in the present paper.
It may seem that asocial stance more positive than assent could not exist; and indeed the fifth 
stance I am about to discuss does not differ in degree from the previous one. In order to make 
something one’s own the agent must have a positive stance and also manifest it. The difference 
has rather to do with the distance of the X accepted from the social agent a which takes her 
personal position. All previous cases entail a certain distance of agent a from the X judged 
and refused, accepted and so on. In the present case, on the contrary, the distance is zero: the 
agent makes of X her own mind. She decides to identify herself with it, somehow.
Let us try to understand how it works, using a comparison with a joint action derived from the 
assent stance. James and Paula are going for a walk, as we already know. We can imagine the 
two being happy about it and manifesting their feeling. In this case they will behave as a body, 
walking together for some time. We have here a body given by two distinct members, each 
doing their part. They behave as “a we”, but I would not say “as one”. Each is doing his or her 
part and is responsible for that alone.
Let us now imagine that the two are colleagues, cops for instance. They are not just giving 
their assent, they are now part of a patrol. While having the walk, they see a well known thief 
and they decide to capture her. Paula blocks the way of escape and James goes straight to the 
thief. They capture her, performing a joint action in which they acted as “a we”, and indeed 
“as one”. They are responsible for the action as a whole and probably they will be praised. 







bond between them made them be one thing: the police making an arrest. To be incorporated 
into something (e.g. family, group of friends, a social institution) gives reasons to act as a we, 
performing collective actions “as one”.
Discussing David Lewis’ famous book on conventions (Lewis 1969), Margaret Gilbert presents 
her own explanation. It seems to be plausible to read her text as I will do here, but I leave 
it opened if this is a correct way. For the sake of my argument, it is enough to show that in 
comparison with the perspective presented, my account of social stances gives a contribution. 
Now, Gilbert defines conventions as jointly accepted fiat. Here is her definition of a joint 
behavior according to a given convention: “Members of a population, P, jointly accept a 
given fiat if and only if (by definition) they are jointly committed to accept as a body that fiat” 
(Gilbert 2014, p. 218).
I want to stress three points about this approach to conventions. First, it is not true that 
any possible convention is the result of a fiat. Under the Nazis, during the Holocaust, Jewish 
people were supposed to wear the star of David. This convention was the result of an odious 
fiat. However, there are and there have always been many other conventions – such as 
“wearing a top hat”, “using in English the word ‘convention’ to mean convention”, “nodding 
to indicate acceptance” –which have not been instituted by any fiat. The fiat is an intentional 
act of institution, while the mentioned conventions simply emerged. There is a second 
and perhaps more dramatic trouble within such understanding of conventions: it seems to 
require acceptance. To keep with the example of the star of David, even if a few Jewish, at the 
beginning, accepted proudly to wear it, in the end they all realized that it was an instrument of 
discrimination and hate. We see here a convention which cannot and should not be accepted 
and indeed was suffered by the majority of the Jewish people and at end by all of them. Finally, 
when one follows a convention, she does not bother to do it as a “we”, if not in special cases. 
Again, as I said, some Jewish people were initially proud to wear the star of David, because it 
gave them the feeling of being a “we”. But, to make a different example, when we use the word 
“convention” we are not thinking of our being a “we”. Which kind of “we” would be at stake?
The degrees of stances I have discussed above are useful to understand the mechanism of 
following a convention. People can just suffer a convention or they can accept it. These two 
cases allow us to understand why it is quite easy to change conventions: there is a significant 
number of people that do not feel any particular commitment to follow a given convention. 
This fact is not explicable within Gilbert’s account. Some people may give their assent to 
a convention, for various reasons (they like it, they have a special role etc.). These are the 
supporters of the convention and they usually tend or are in duty to give social sanctions to 
those who do not follow it, if this is expected. A teacher, for instance, will underline with a 
red pen her student’s text if it reads “convintion” instead of “convention”. Finally, there are 
those who think that a certain convention expresses the “we” of their group. In this case, they 
will be ready to apply some kind a social rebuke, from a nasty look to more severe sanctions 
such as ostracism. Indeed, to enter the tatami in jeans and sweater is not advised, not even to a 
beginner.
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